"Assad proved that he knew exactly who the the real powers, who determine the balance of threats in the Middle East"

"... For the past two years, there have been a number of generally accepted assumptions about what will finally happen in Syria. By late last week, these assumptions came crashing down with the raucous force of an earthquake. We are talking about the very opinions that were considered to be conventional wisdom among the Israeli public, and which had considerable impact on political decision-makers and military strategists alike for the past two years. These are the core assumptions:

* International intervention in Syria is inevitable. Sooner or later the free world will be forced to take action to save the country’s civilian population from the clutches of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his army. 

* An Israeli attack on Assad will cause him to recoil in terror and force him to avoid transferring arms to Hezbollah or responding with a counter-attack. 

* The aid that Qatar and Turkey provide to the rebels should ultimately change the balance of power. 

* The apple (Bashar) has fallen far from the tree (former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad). According to this assumption, Bashar is afraid of his own shadow, and even the faintest breeze can discombobulate him and throw him off balance (this is, by the way, how he is portrayed in the popular Israeli television satire "Eretz Nehederet," but more on that later). 

* Israeli intelligence assessments provide an accurate account of the situation and should be the basis of any future decisions about how to respond to the situation in Syria. 

* “Assad’s regime will be deposed in a matter of weeks” (former Defense Minister Ehud Barak on Dec. 11, 2011).

... By the end of last week, reality seemed to prove that Israeli intelligence assessments claiming Assad would soon fall were premature at best. Furthermore, an Israeli source was now quoted by the London Times as saying (May 18, 2013) that in the current circumstances, Assad is actually good for Israel: “Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there.” The real question is: “Where were they before this?” By “they” I mean those people described as “Israeli decision-makers” and “senior officials,” who are quoted in the press...
The U-turn that Israel has made this past week in its attitude toward Assad raises serious questions about the people behind our defense strategy. Did none of them know before last week what Assad has been saying for a long time now, that his country has become home to a hodgepodge of terrorist organizations?
Instead of responding to this, analyzing it, and preparing for the worst-case scenario, Israel preferred to mock Assad instead. The parodies of Assad (such as the aforementioned "Eretz Nehederet") depict him as a reluctant coward, a “wimp” to use a more colloquial term, who will not be able to withstand all the pressure being placed on him. In this, he is juxtaposed with other Arab leaders, who were once perceived as being strong: former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi both come to mind.........
As we already noted, the high point of Israel’s failure to understand what is going on in Syria came in Ehud Barak’s statement of 2011. At the time, he gave Assad just a few weeks before he would be toppled. That was a year and a half ago. Since then, Barak has been “toppled,” while Assad remains in power.
What was the basis of Barak’s assessment? The Research Division of Military Intelligence? International security experts? It is more likely that his estimation was based on the same “wimpy” image of Assad as being spineless and lacking leadership experience, as someone who inherited his position of power, and who everyone else has wrapped around their little fingers.

But Assad and his entourage realized that if he was to survive, he would first have to identify the real powers, who determine the balance of threats in the Middle East. And he proved that he knew exactly who they were. Twelve Russian warships sailing off the Syrian coast are just one proof of that. His decision to aim missiles at Tel Aviv to counter a potential Israeli attack is yet further evidence.
This leaves us with one possible conclusion: The assumption that Assad would fall if he dared to attack Israel (in response to an Israeli strike against him) was not as accurate as previously thought.
But that hardly prevents Israel from carrying on with its war games. “Security sources” and “decision-makers” alike continue to ponder whether Assad or the rebels are better for Israel and what steps the country should take, as if they had any say whatsoever in the current situation.
The one person to best express this was the former Israeli Military Intelligence head Uri Sagi, who rose up like a thundering prophet, ignored by the people of his city, to ask, “Who are we to decide? What tools do we have to determine who will rule in neighboring Syria and how?”

'Egyptians don’t like Morsi!'

"... A Pew Research poll released last week found that only 30 percent of Egyptians believe the nation is headed in the right direction, compared with 65 percent during the 2011 uprising. The number is back to the levels of Mubarak; in the year before his ouster, only 28 percent of Egyptians thought the country was headed in the right direction...."

Morsi dispatches army to Sinai after suspected Islamists snatch soldiers

"... In a break from past practices, Morsi said he would not negotiate with kidnappers, which some interpreted as an effort by the beleaguered president to appear tough in the face of his falling popularity and a general decline in security across the country...."

'Rebels' will not be missed by Qusayr residents ...

[Der Spiegel] "... Somehow, though, the interview was arranged in the end. Reserved and halting, the women described what happened to their husbands, brothers and nephews back in their hometown of Qusayr in Syria. They were killed by Syrian rebel fighters, the women said -- murdered because they were Christians, people who in the eyes of radical Islamist freedom fighters have no place in the new Syria..."

... as we said, it's not Jabhat al Nusra, it's Jabhaaat al Nusra!

"...The battle — Marakit il Bina il Marsoos — was ended shortly after the success of the government soldiers’ subterfuge in Sahyan, which broke the siege on Wadi Deif and its defenses. Since then, there have been several other smaller offensives against government positions with names like One Body and Repelling the Enemy, but they all failed to dislodge government forces. A new offensive, Retaliation of Banias, is currently under way and focusing on the Karmid checkpoint, a large government outpost from which troops regularly shell surrounding villages in southern Idlib, and the Abu Duhoor military airport, one of the last military airports still in government hands in the area.
Defections around Wadi Deif have decreased since the failed offensive, commanders say, and some lessons learned — about the reliability of certain groups, the fickleness of weapons suppliers, the lack of strategic planning of some commanders — have been noted. “If a commander suggests a plan and it is a failure and illogical, we won’t rely on him again,” says Abu Akram. Other lessons, especially about forging rebel unity, have not been applied. “We talk about Farouq, Suqoor, Martyrs of Syria, all of them are respected, but we are getting caught up in these names and this is affecting things on the ground,” says Hajj Zaki, the Farouq Brigade’s commander along the Zahlanee front. “If we don’t eliminate the names, we cannot learn to be organized, and that’s the truth, even if it hurts.”..."

"Assad talks, Russia walks!"

"... While Bashar al-Assad was talking, Russia was walking. President Vladimir Putin - well aware that the Geneva talks are being derailed by various actors even before they happen - moved Russian naval vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean; and offered Syria a batch of ultra-modern ground-to-sea Yakhont missiles plus a batch of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles - the Russian equivalent to the American Patriot. Not to mention that Syria already has Russian SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles.
Now try, any one of you NATO-GCC gang, even bypassing the UN, to unleash a mini-Shock and Awe on Damascus. Or to install a no-fly zone. Qatar and the House of Saud, militarily, are a joke. The Brits and France are seriously tempted, but they don't have the means - or the stomach. Washington has the means - but no stomach. Putin was dead sure the Pentagon would read his message accordingly..."

Zzzzzzzz ...

"... "I believe in the two-state solution," Lapid told Yediot. "In my opinion, there is nothing more dangerous than the idea of a bi-national state."At the same time, though, Lapid, like Netanyahu, rejects a full withdrawal to Israel's 1967 lines.
Lapid favors a broad pullout from the West Bank, including the dismantling of many settlements, but believes Israel should hold on to major "blocs" along the Israeli frontier where the majority of settlers live.
Lapid also believes that Israel should keep control of east Jerusalem, home to sensitive Jewish, Muslim and Christian religious sites. The Palestinians claim east Jerusalem as their capital.
Nimr Hamad, an adviser to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, gave Lapid's proposal a cool reception (Hooray!)...."

Syrian Army captures Israeli vehicle in Qusayr

Qusayr: Insurgents & Israel share a setback

"...This told the rebels that the supportive Turkish channel was closing down.It is obvious to them that the conference can only succeed if Washington comes over to the Russian-Iranian-Hizballah side and agrees to the perpetuation of the Assad party’s role in any future government.
As yet, neither of the contestants has agreed to attend the conference for which no date has been set. However, Turkish backing and arms supplies through its territory are expected to shrink progressively to squeeze the rebels into accepting a formula which would be tantamount to bowing to the defeat of their uprising.
4. For Israel, the fall of al Qusayr means that while rebel supply routes are shut down, supply routes open up for the free movement of Iranian weapons from Syria straight to HIzballah strongholds in Lebanon. This would be Hizballah’s reward for its military aid to Assad’s army.
If Prime Minister Netanyahu was serious about his promise Sunday to cut off Hizballah’s weapon routes from Syria, he has three primary options to choose from – none of them easy, to say the least.

a)  Military intervention in al Qusayr before the Syrian army and Hizballah clinch their takeover of this strategic byway town. This would catapult Israel into full-blown war with Syria and Hizballah and is therefore a non-starter.b)  Bombardment of the convoys carrying arms from Syria to Lebanon.This won’t do much good. Having learned its lesson from the three Israeli air strikes against arms convoys and depots this year, Syria has now transferred the hardware disassembled into component parts and passed them out among smuggling rings ato move them under cover of dark into Lebanon.c)  Attacks on the destination of those weapons – Hizballah depots in the Hermel – after their delivery. This would almost certainly trigger Hizballah war action against Israel. ..."

Dreaming of the 'End of the regime in Syria, the destruction of Hezbollah, & pushing Iran back inside its borders?' ... Beware of the outcome!

"... In these circumstances, we have to comprehend one truth, that the active resistance front with the enemy has expanded. Enthusiasts should begin to learn the details of Occupied Golan's geography, get used to the names of settlements, positions, and commercial, industrial, and tourism centers, and get ready for a different reality.But if Israel decides to act in deterrence, this means that it decided to cut the rope. And then, it will face full-spectrum engagement, under one title: changing the face of the region! ..."

Ziad Baroud discovers ...the baroud! (gunpowder)

“The first scenario is holding the elections according to the 1960 electoral law, the second is a new electoral law, the third scenario is  political void, and the fourth scenario is the extension of the Parliament’s mandate... ” (Wow! Came up with this all alone Your excellency?)

Israeli Exports to Turkey Hit All-Time High

"...n an interview with the Calcalist economics daily, Ramsy Gabai, head of the Israel Export Institute, said that the increase in Israeli exports to Turkey had more to do with Turkey's needs for high quality products made in Israel, than in improved political relations between the two countries. However, he said, with the improved diplomatic atmosphere, he was sure Israel would be doing even more business with Turkey in the coming months. ..."

Obama to Erdogan: 'You toe the line... NOW!'

"...What happened instead is that Obama convinced Erdoğan to move away from the military line and support the political-diplomatic effort, now being spearheaded by Washington and Moscow, for a settlement to the conflict through talks involving the Syrian opposition and the regime. A meeting under UN auspices in Geneva in July 2012 had endorsed the idea of talks between the opposition and the regime, but Ankara never approached it with much enthusiasm.Erdoğan himself is on record as saying recently that the effort to revive the Geneva process amounts to “spreading flour on a string,” a Turkish saying suggesting a waste of time. The fact that he is now openly supporting the proposed second Geneva summit, expected to be held in the coming weeks, represents a serious change in position.
Aware, however, that Ankara’s open support for the Geneva process would be out of tune with the media hype in Turkey prior to Erdoğan’s Washington visit, Obama did not leave his host in the lurch. During their joint press conference at the White House with Erdoğan he reiterated that they were “going to keep increasing the pressure on the Assad regime and working with the Syrian opposition.”...
These remarks were enough to save the day for Erdoğan back in Turkey given that he continues to insist there is no room for Assad in any settlement. Tellingly, pro-government papers in Turkey were keen to highlight these remarks of Obama’s. But the devil is in the details and it did not take long for experts to see this after a “holistic” appraisal of Obama’s remarks.
Obama had, after all, also indicated that the US “preference” was to have seen Assad go a long time ago, but suggested there is no “magic formula” to achieve this. He also added revealingly that “Turkey is going to play an important role as we bring representatives of the regime and opposition together in the coming weeks.”
Reflecting on these remarks, it was clear to Turkish foreign policy experts that Ankara has come around to supporting the Geneva process. Erdoğan himself confirmed this during the press conference with Obama when he said, “The step to be taken by the UN Security Council and the Geneva process are important.”
He also added that it was “very important” for Russia and China to be part of this process, saying, “Their participation in this process will certainly add greater impetus.” These remarks of Erdoğan also underscored Ankara’s change in position, given that Moscow and Beijing are continuing with their support for Assad and his regime.
Erdoğan’s government appears to have conceded that while Assad may not be physically at the negotiating table, his presence will be felt whether Ankara likes it or not. Meanwhile, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Armed Forces is due to meet in Istanbul on May 23-25 to establish its stance on the upcoming Geneva talks, and Washington is clearly hoping that the representative to be sent to Geneva will be chosen there with Turkey’s support.
Washington’s recalibration of Turkey’s Syrian policy was also apparent in other areas too. Especially when Obama said during the news conference with Erdoğan that they would keep working for a Syria “that is intact and inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups; and that’s a source of stability, not extremism, because it's in the profound interest of all our nations, especially Turkey.”
These words are significant in light of accusations leveled against the Erdoğan government of supporting the Sunnis in Syria while disregarding the interests and concerns of the Alawites and Christians. Obama’s words are also significant given US dissatisfaction over the presence of al-Qaeda related groups fighting Assad, with support from Turkey, which hope to establish an Islamic state in Syria.

 

'Daily Syria ripples in Turkey!' 

Obama’s suggestion that Turkey will be one of the main beneficiaries of keeping extremism at bay in Syria can be read as an indirect reference to the recent Reyhanli bombing massacre, allegedly by Assad loyalists, with the implication being that if Turkey plays with fire it will get its hands burned one way or another.
The public expectation in Turkey after the Reyhanli massacre, in which the death toll has reached 52, is also that groups like the Al Nusra Front be placed under closer scrutiny, and be prevented from using Turkish territory for logistical support, since this increases the risk of retaliatory strikes in Turkey by Assad loyalists.
The Turkish public is not too happy over Erdoğan’s announcement in Washington that Ankara’s open-door policy toward Syrian refugees would continue, but many experts say this policy will also be “recalibrated” in the coming period given the risk of clashes between increasingly angry locals and refugees, especially after the twin car bombings in Reyhanli.
The bottom line is that having gone to Washington to try to sway the Obama administration on Syria, Erdogan has ended up being convinced that it is Ankara that needs to recalibrate its Syrian policy, which has in fact provided no results date, leaving Turkey instead facing serious security threats."

The Guardian: "EU support boosts Jihadists in Syria!"

Syrian Government must be thankful for the strategically astute Europeans!

"... The EU decision to lift Syrian oil sanctions to aid the opposition has accelerated a scramble for control over wells and pipelines in rebel-held areas and helped consolidate the grip of jihadist groups over the country's key resources.Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaida and other extreme Islamist groups, control the majority of the oil wells in Deir Ezzor province, displacing local Sunni tribes, sometimes by force. They have also seized control of other fields from Kurdish groups further to the north-east, in al-Hasakah governorate.
As opposition groups have turned their guns on each other in the battle over oil, water and agricultural land, military pressure on Bashar al-Assad's government from the north and east has eased off...." 

No electoral law: Lebanon's parliament 'in overtime'

 'Awaiting salvation from Syria!'

"... Because deputies were deadlocked over a new elections law, the likelihood of extending Parliament’s four-year mandate, which expires on June 20, reached the level of near-certainty even if Berri voiced his opposition to an extension. “I don’t have any desire for an extension [of Parliament’s term] even for one day,” he declared, adding: “I reject the talk about an extension for six months or four years. For my part, [an extension of Parliament’s term] is out of the question and poses a danger to democracy.” (wink, wink)..."

"Saudi Arabia is excising Qatar from the Lebanon & Syria!"

 'Gone a 'menage a deux & a quarter'!'

"...According to sources knowledgeable in internal Saudi affairs, Riyadh considers its dispute with Qatar — subsequent to the latter’s support for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood reaching power — as a dispute with strategic overtones. Lately, specifically after the naming of Tammam Salam as prime minister-designate to form a new Lebanese government, the alliance between Doha and Riyadh in managing the Lebanese arena has shown signs of disintegrating. The last time the two countries were in accord over Lebanon was when [former Lebanese] Prime Minister Saad Hariri visited Qatar last summer, and later appeared in a photograph with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim when both visited Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz.The Syrian crisis was responsible for restoring harmony between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon; throughout the preceding period, between 2006 and 2011, Qatar had taken the side in Lebanon of the March 8 alliance backed by Damascus and Iran, while Saudi Arabia stood with the March 14 coalition, whose main Sunni constituent (the Future Movement) is a Saudi protégé. The reasons that drove Qatar to espouse its aforementioned position remain unknown to this day; but some in Hezbollah think that Doha’s bias toward the Iranian-Syrian axis in Lebanon was not genuine, but was merely a political role assigned by Washington on Qatar — the location of the largest American military base in the Arab Gulf..., ..., ...
During the Syrian crisis and before, even when Hezbollah and its allies ousted Saad Hariri from the Lebanese premiership, the political divergence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon lost its raison d'être, and they both re-adopted the traditional Gulf policy of concentrating on weakening Iranian influence in the Orient. Doha and Riyadh therefore switched to an offensive policy, through publicly supporting the Syrian opposition bent on toppling Bashar al-Assad’s Iranian-allied regime, and by extension, weakening Iran’s Lebanese allies, led by Hezbollah.
In its internal discussions, Hezbollah affirms that Qatari funding stands behind the rise of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, who came to prominence in the last two years by challenging and criticizing Hezbollah from his Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Sidon. Hezbollah’s information also indicates that Saudi Arabia is funding Salafist factions in Lebanon that profess animosity towards the party.
Yet, it’s been obvious lately that the honeymoon between Riyadh and Doha in Lebanon is ending. The main point of contention between them this time is the issue of support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. While Qatar and Turkey are planning to make the Brotherhood the spearhead of their future influence in Syria following Assad’s ouster, Riyadh, on the other hand, backs the advent to power of moderate Sunni factions, most of which are comprised of Syrian Army defectors and other figures who don’t belong to Islamist movements. From Riyadh’s perspective, its disagreement with Qatar about the Brotherhood is a strategic one. For Saudi Arabia is wary of the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, which today represents the main internal opposition to the Saudi ruling family. Riyadh wants Qatar to abandon its plan to back the Muslim Brotherhood because it would become a source of strength for the Saudi Sahwa movement if it were to attain power in Syria.
Riyadh is therefore developing a new policy in Lebanon, and has begun opening up to all Lebanese political powers, including Iran’s ally Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which belongs to the Iranian-Syrian axis of resistance. Saudi Arabia is also bolstering its influence on Sunni Lebanese factions, in order to minimize Qatari influence over them. There are indications that Riyadh has succeeded in dispelling Qatar’s role in Lebanon, as evidenced by the lack of visits by Lebanese officials to Doha recently, and the resurgence of visits to Saudi Arabia instead. Furthermore, Sheikh Assir’s vitriolic Qatari-influenced verbal attacks on Hezbollah have ceased lately.
Qatar’s role in the region is the subject of behind-the-scenes attacks by factions close to Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, and talk about it being a country that is trying to fight above its weight class has risen to prominence once again. All of this points to Saudi Arabia having decided to excise Qatar from the Lebanese as well as the Eastern scenes. This is all part of a comprehensive Saudi agenda to strike at the Muslim Brotherhood and weaken the influence of the countries that support it in sensitive areas of the Arab and Muslim worlds.  "

... predictably, as things somewhat taper off in Syria, they flare up in North Lebanon!

Syrian Army controls Qusair

"Syrian troops have stormed the rebel stronghold of Qusair and now control the town centre, state media say.State TV says 70 "terrorists" have been killed while activists say 40 people have died including many rebels.
The town, near the Lebanese border, has been under siege for weeks. Its control would give the government access from the capital to the coast..."

The New York Times WANTS mayhem in Syria!

Look at the title:

"Syria’s Assad, in an Interview, Suggests Peace Talks Are Unlikely to Succeed"

... and then look at context:

"... “We do not believe that many Western countries really want a solution in Syria,” Mr. Assad told Argentina’s Clarín newspaper in an interview  published online on Saturday, blaming those countries for supporting “terrorists” fighting his government.“We support and applaud the efforts, but we must be realistic,” he said, referring to efforts by the United States and Russia to broker talks in June. “There cannot be a unilateral solution in Syria; two parties are needed at least.”
Mr. Assad took a hard line throughout the interview, according to a transcript in English provided in advance to The New York Times. (case closed) ..."

Is flip-flopping US sponsored Idriss next after Hitto?

"...Immediately after Hitto’s narrow victory in the coalition’s vote, several members suspended their membership and the armed wing of the group – the Free Syrian Army command – issued a statement that it (first)  opposed his election.The U.S.-recognized rebel commander, defected Gen. Salim Idriss, since has reversed that stance,..."

From one success, to another ...and another ...

"... Hitto’s ouster after just two months would deal a double blow to the State Department, which has spent more than $60 million to boost the credibility of the Syrian opposition. In April, the group’s first president, Mouaz al Khatib, stepped down after just five months in office, to be replaced by George Sabra...."

Jabhat al Nusra is dead; Long live Jabhaaat al Nusra!

Jabhat al Nusra is dead; Long live Jabhaaat al Nusra!

"... Al Qaeda's Iraq-based wing, which nurtured Nusra in the early stages of the rebellion against Assad, has moved in and sidelined the organization, Nusra sources and other rebels say.Al Qaeda in Iraq includes thousands of foreign fighters whose ultimate goal is not toppling Assad but the anti-Western jihad of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri - a shift which could extend Syria's conflict well beyond any political accord between Assad and his foes... And if the West were to intervene, it may now be under pressure to attack al Qaeda opposition forces rather than Assad.
"Nusra is now two Nusras. One that is pursuing al Qaeda's agenda of a greater Islamic nation, and another that is Syrian with a national agenda to help us fight Assad, It is disintegrating from within" said a senior rebel commander in Syria who has close ties to the Nusra Front. Others said that Nusra's Syrian contingent has already effectively collapsed ... , ..., ... 

Nusra sources said they were waiting for Zawahri to settle the issue, hoping he would call on Baghdadi to return to Iraq.
"We have two choices now. Either Zawahri announces the separation of Syria's Nusra from Iraq's Islamic State, or he orders Baghdadi to stay (in Syria) and if this happen then its a disaster," said one Nusra source. "Baghdadi has harmed the Nusra Front. He caused great damage and broke up the front."
But the Syrian rebel commander, who is from a Western-backed rebel group, said that Baghdadi already had Zawahri's blessing when he moved in....
The senior rebel commander said he even expected the growing clout of Baghdadi's fighters would finally end the West's reluctance to intervene militarily in Syria - not against Assad, but his hardline enemies.
"We expect soon drone attacks, like Yemen, to begin against al Qaeda members," he said.... "

Revaluation of a strategic importance: "The Middle East lost its status as the default energy supplier to the US!"

'The debate within the foreign policy community about Syria continues to rage, with no decisions forthcoming. As a senior analyst in the military intelligence community remarked to us: “for every reason in favor of taking action, there is an equally compelling reason not to. We just can’t puzzle out how to make this work for us.” The situation of indecision remains, therefore, much as we have been reporting for some weeks and we see little immediate scope for US military intervention short of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Underlying this stand-back approach in the White House, some strategic changes in the US posture to the Middle East are beginning to manifest themselves. Some commentators refer to this as a “retreat,” but from our private exchanges with senior officials, we see an incipient revaluation in progress of the strategic importance to the US of the Middle East. To be sure, the pace of diplomatic activity continues unbroken. Despite a series of contentious domestic troubles, there is no sign of inattention in President Obama’s discussions with visiting Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, the meetings between Secretary of Defense Hagel and his foreign counterparts and the renewed travel to the Middle East by Secretary of State Kerry. An important new report from the International Energy Agency, however, sets out a new context for US energy supplies. Simply put, the Middle East is losing its status as the default energy supplier to the US. In an exchange with an NSC official on this subject, he remarked to us: “This phenomenon will take a long time to work its way through the system, but over the years the emergence of virtual North American energy sufficiency will be as important a development as the collapse of the Soviet Union. The temptation to draw in our overall presence will be very great.” Rather than trying to resolve what are increasingly seen as insoluble Middle East regional issues, the US may start focusing more on global challenges like terrorism spreading into Northern Nigeria and the rise of China’s military power. As Obama prepares to travel to next month’s G8 summit, some of this new orientation in US policy may become more apparent.'

“Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine..."

Report: " ...“Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there,” one senior Israeli intelligence officer was quoted as saying..."

Russia sends 'no-fly-zone' busting missiles to Syria

"...Unlike Scud and other longer-range surface-to-surface missiles that the Assad government has used against opposition forces, the Yakhont antiship missile system provides the Syrian military a formidable weapon to counter any effort by international forces to reinforce Syrian opposition fighters by imposing a naval embargo, establishing a no-fly zone or carrying out limited airstrikes. ..."

Qatar's gambit in Syria: "Decreasing ability to influence & becoming a scapegoat for all participants"

"... Yet, as the Arab world’s bloodiest uprising grinds on into its third year, Qatar finds itself pulled into a complicated and fractured conflict, the outcome of which has a decreasing ability to influence, while simultaneously becoming a high-profile scapegoat for participants on both sides. Among the Syrian regime’s numerous but fragmented opponents the small Gulf state evokes a surprisingly ambivalent – and often overtly hostile – response... Qatar has been in the lead, readily disgorging its gas-generated wealth in the pursuit of the downfall of the House of Assad. Qatar’s role in Syria seems uncharacteristically prominent for a country that lacks the diplomatic experience and traditional heavyweight status of a more discreet Saudi Arabia.In the shell-blasted areas of rebel-held Syria, few appear to be aware of the vast sums that Qatar has contributed – estimated by rebel and diplomatic sources to be about $1bn, but put by people close to the Qatar government at as much as $3bn....©EPATo some extent, the fact that Qatar is so exposed reflects the reluctance of western governments to intervene in Syria. ...
Most of Doha’s neighbours in the Gulf are hostile to the Islamist trend in the region, but this is of little consequence to a state that takes pleasure in being contrarian. Nor are the al-Thanis embarrassed by the contradictions of an autocracy cheerleading for revolution. “The Qataris say if there’s a tsunami coming your way you ride it, not let it hit you,” says a western diplomat describing Qatar’s attitude towards Islamists.... the military stalemate of the Syrian uprising, has also revealed the recklessness and political impotence that ultimately undermine Qatar’s objectives....“The Qataris are overextended – their system runs on a few people at the top, and there isn’t much in terms of a bureaucracy,” comments another diplomat.... the disapproval levelled at Qatar is pervasive. A senior rebel commander who has dealt with the Qataris suggests that Doha should look long and hard at why its role has also sparked so much animosity. “After two years it is time for everyone involved in Syria to review their actions and engage in self-correction,” he says....
their efforts to shape a fragmented rebel army into a more coherent form by helping to unify the brigades under one command have contributed to its incoherence.One person who influenced the emir’s thinking at the time is Azmi Bishara, a prominent former Arab Israeli MP, exiled in Qatar...
An adviser to the emir and the crown prince, Bishara has become something of a court intellectual in Doha. He is said to have been involved in the formation of the Syrian National Coalition, now the main opposition umbrella group, and to have been used to “test” opposition figures...
Doha’s leaders were particularly emboldened by the revolt in Libya, where Qatar had played the lead Arab role in the Nato-led intervention...they expected western partners would eventually step in on the side of the opposition... Assad’s removal, after all, served the strategic purpose of weakening Iran, his closest regional ally. So far at least, this gamble has proved a miscalculation. ..
Supporting the armed rebellion was the inevitable next stage of Qatar’s deepening involvement in Syria,  buying arms in Libya and in eastern European states, and flying them to Turkey, where intelligence services helped deliver them across the border. At first, say people with direct knowledge of the arms shipments, Qatar worked through Turkish intelligence to identify recipients, and then, as Saudi Arabia joined the covert military effort, through Lebanese mediators (Here) ...
Qatar is, as its detractors say, seeking to build up a proxy force in Syria to implement its regional agenda, it is doing so in an environment which is not conducive to either loyalty or cohesion... For the Saudis, the handful of secular rebel factions, plus the Salafi groups that espouse a stricter Wahabi Islam practised in Saudi Arabia, are vastly preferable to the Brotherhood, a more organised political group and therefore a greater political threat... the erratic and limited nature of weapons shipments means that even recipients of Qatari support are not always aware of Doha’s role. ...
But the behaviour has bred resentment. “Qatar and Saudi Arabia … are playing out their rivalries here, they are dividing people,” says Abdul Jabbar Akaidi, the head of the Aleppo revolutionary military council. Speaking from one of his bases on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, he adds: “People will remember those who gave without having an agenda. The Syrians are clever, they know when there is an agenda.”
By late 2012 a new factor was emerging in Syria, one that had the potential to complicate Qatar’s relationship with the west. The extremist group Jabhat al-Nusrah was gaining ground, playing a prominent role in dislodging the regime from military facilities in northern Syria. In December, the US felt sufficiently alarmed to add Nusrah to its global terrorist list.
Concerned that Qatar’s level of tolerance for radical Islamists was higher than theirs, western governments also wanted safeguards in place to ensure that weapons did not end up in the hands of jihadi groups like Nusrah. The problem, says one former senior US official, was that “the Qataris felt it didn’t matter who you give to, what’s important is to bring down Bashar.”According to him, the objective in Washington became “to keep the Qataris from doing whatever they want”. So the US instituted a “consultative process”. Two “operations” rooms that oversee weapons deliveries were set up, one in Turkey, the other, more recently, in Jordan....Yet allegations that the Qataris have – directly or indirectly – helped Jabhat al-Nusrah have not gone away...
Beneath the quips, however, are signs that Qatar’s influence over military supplies to the rebellion may be waning, ..."

Tunisia sends request to Damascus to reopen its embassy

'"Tunisia wants to reopen its embassy in Syria which has been closed for more than two years and has sent a request in this vein to the government in Damascus. Tunis is yet to receive a reply from Syria’s foreign ministry and a diplomatic source said that the letter has been sent to the foreign ministry since “last week.”Reports claim that the reopening of the embassy could be delayed. Tunisia quickly closed its embassy when the uprising against the Assad regime began in 2011. It will become the first country to reopen its diplomatic office in Syria if its request receives a positive response from the foreign ministry. .."

"Qatar’s emir, wants to be the Arab world’s Jihadist Nasser”

"The gas-rich state of Qatar has spent as much as $3bn over the past two years supporting the rebellion in Syria, far exceeding any other government, but is now being nudged aside by Saudi Arabia as the prime source of arms to rebels...,According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks arms transfers, Qatar has sent the most weapons deliveries to Syria, with more than 70 military cargo flights into neighbouring Turkey between April 2012 and March this year.For Qatar, owner of the world’s third-largest gas reserves, its intervention in Syria is part of an aggressive quest for global recognition and is merely the latest chapter in its attempt to establish itself as a major player in the region, following its backing of Libya’s rebels who overthrew Muammer Gaddafi in 2011.
But though its approach is driven more by pragmatism and opportunism, than ideology, Qatar has become entangled in the polarised politics of the region, setting off scathing criticism. “You can’t buy a revolution,” says an opposition businessman.
Qatar’s support for Islamist groups in the Arab world, which puts it at odds with its peers in the Gulf states, has fuelled rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar’s ruling emir, “wants to be the Arab world’s Islamist (Gamal) Abdelnasser”, said an Arab politician, referring to Egypt’s fiery late president and devoted pan-Arab leader.
Qatar’s intervention is coming under mounting scrutiny. Regional rivals contend it is using its financial firepower simply to buy future influence and that it has ended up splintering Syria’s opposition. Against this backdrop Saudi Arabia, which until now has been a more deliberate backer of Syria’s rebels, has stepped up its involvement....
The relegation of Qatar to second place in providing weapons follows concern in the West and among other Arab states that weapons it supplies could fall into the hands of an al-Qaeda-linked group, Jabhat al-Nusrah.Diplomats also say the Qataris have had trouble securing a steady supply of arms, something the Saudis have been able to do via their more developed networks.
A supply route across Jordan’s border to southern Syria has opened up in recent months. The Jordanian government, which is terrified of jihadis getting the upper hand in its neighbour, has been reluctantly allowing Saudi deliveries.

The west’s reluctance to intervene more forcefully in Syria has all but left Bashar al-Assad’s opponents reliant for support on Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey though since late last year, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan have joined the rebels’ backers as junior partners..."

An Egypt in confusion still "reassures the US & Israel"

MEPGS; Excerpts; 

  “...   While some experts somewhat smugly call the Syrian civil war, “Iran’s Vietnam”, more are concerned with the already dramatic effects on neighboring countries.  “It has accelerated Iraq’s move toward Iran and in the process relit the civil war there,” notes one veteran US analyst.  There are competing views as to whether Lebanon or Jordan is more endangered by the “spillover.”  Both have long had a precarious political balance in their political make-up.  But with Hezbollah throwing much of its weight onto the side of the Syrian government,  some believe it is only a matter of time before the balance is overturned.
Jordan is now bearing an economically unacceptable number of refugees, many poor and unskilled, causing resentment among the working classes in that country long split between the “traditional “East Bankers and the relative newcomers – the Palestinians – who, by all accounts constitute a majority of the population.  King Abduallah gets mixed reviews for handling the situation.  But the consensus is that he lacks the touch of his late father, King Hussein.
            Even amongst more secure neighbors, such as Israel and Turkey, the shock is felt daily.  Turkey’s President Erdogan,  has long pressed for the ouster of Bashar Assad...  while Erdogan’s rhetoric towards Assad has been harsh, given the ethnic (read: Kurds) as well as public opinion constraints, he is loathe to act unilaterally.  While Israel has neither the ethnic nor public opinion constraints, which has allowed them to strike at will militarily [Most recently at an arms depot purportedly containing long range missiles destined for Hezbollah], senior Israeli officials are still wary of getting too close to the chaos that characterize the uproar in the Middle East in general and the chaos that is Syria specifically.  As one well-placed Israeli put it, “No one here knows how to deal with the Arab Spring.  It’s best we hide until it’s over.”..., ..., ...,
            Egypt, with the region’s largest population and putative leader of the Arab world, run by an increasingly authoritarian Moslem Brotherhood, wealthy Gulf countries (notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are getting jittery.  Like the Administration, they see the “Brothers” stocking key posts with party faithful, unqualified for their roles.  A case in point, notes one long time observer, “The technocrats necessary to negotiate with bodies like the IMF have long since fled the country.”  Veteran US experts believe that the Moslem Brotherhood, after so many decades in the political wilderness, is determined, above all else, not to lose power. Still, Administration officials and even the Israelis have been reassured by Cairo’s adherence to, what, after all is the cornerstone of US Middle East Policy – The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.
            The moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process, however, is a different story.  Secretary of State Kerry is attempting to breathe new life into it.  So far, he has had numerous meetings with key Israeli and Arab leaders [Often one-on-one, to the chagrin of veteran State Department officials].  While there is some expectation that talks could begin again in the not-too-distant future, few believe, considering the lack of leadership on the ground and the lack of interest in the White House, that Kerry will get very far with his efforts.
            But many believe that a vigorous Administration role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking is crucial to boost the sagging image of the US throughout the region.  While President Obama did himself a world of good by his visit to Israel [Certainly among the Israelis, some of whom sheepishly admit that their previous coolness towards him may have been racially motivated], he still faces the challenge of a nuclear armed Iran...  As one key State Department official put it this week, “First we have to wait out the Iranian election results next month; followed by the inauguration of the new President and then in September we have our annual “UNGA” (United Nations General Assembly] bash.”
But US officials admit that it is Iran that will set the time table for action – if there is to be any.  “So far, they have been very clever,” says one Administration official.  “They have been careful not to do anything that would allow for a mad dash towards producing a weapon.  They take one step back for every two steps forward.”

Senior US Official: "Qatar's Emir just lied to our face!"

MEPGS Excerpts;  

"... Even beyond Syria’s immediate neighbors, there is confusion, or at least splits among the various Arab leaders.  The tiny but quite wealthy and active Qatar, which, as the expression goes, has been “punching above its weight,” is a case in point.  Its leadership (which consists of three men, the Emir, his son and the Foreign Minister) has consistently backed Islamist forces with money and war material in their rebellion against the established order, whether in Libya or now, Syria.  Some say, this has chagrined the Saudis [A practice, their hard drinking, yet fellow Wahabbis are prone to do]. Others argue the usually reticent [and now somewhat geriatric]Saudi leadership has found it convenient to allow Qatar to take the lead.  Still, few in Washington are pleased with Qatar’s policies across the board.  Recent meetings with the Emir did not go well.  The US wanted a pledge that Qatar would no longer support “extremist” Islamists fighting in Syria.  “He said they wouldn’t,” noted a well-placed US official, who then added “He just lied to our faces.”  Even Qatar policies towards friends are causing angst in Washington.  For example, its  “no-strings attached” assistance to Egypt, undermines the Administration’s goal of getting Cairo to adopt an International Monetary Fund [“IMF”] plan for getting its fiscal house in order [US officials say, that while Qatar has provided Cairo with grants totaling more than $6 billion, the terms of their most recent example of largesse were not so generous.  What Cairo thought was a interest free $3 billion loan turned out to have an interest rate of 5% , with the principal due within 18 months]..."

'Criminal State's settlers' storm al Aqsa

Leverett: 'The US can either accept that toppling Assad to hurt Iran has failed or continue supporting the 'opposition' with years of violence in sight'

"... As to diplomatic prospects with regard to Syria, Flynt notes,

“Russia, Iran, China (the players that are usually associated, in common parlance, as in some ways being supportive of the Syrian government):  if you look at their position, and even the position of the Syrian government, they have been open to a political process—to having a dialogue with the opposition aimed at some sort of political settlement, which would produce a different kind of political order in Syria.  But it’s the opposition elements, backed by the United States, which have insisted not just on preconditions but in effect on ‘pre-results’ from a meeting, where they have to have, up front, some commitment that Assad is going to step down before this process even gets going.  That’s not a serious diplomatic position. 

If you want to stop violence in Syria, you have to get all parties to the table, you can’t have these kinds of absurd preconditions, and you have to get down to the business of diplomacy.  I think that Russia, frankly, China, and Iran have been trying to do that, trying harder to get that kind of process off the ground, than the United States has been. Because for the United States to do this means it’s acknowledging that it can’t just dictate outcomes in this part of the world.  It actually has to accommodate other parties’ interests; it has to accommodate on-the-ground reality.”     

Flynt goes on to put Russian and Chinese vetoes of three U.S.-backed UN Security Council resolutions on Syria in a very different perspective from that typically deployed in mainstream Western discourse: 

“The Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN come against the backdrop of both Russia and China having let the Libya resolution go through in March 2011—the Libya resolution that authorized the use of force to protect civilian populations on humanitarian grounds, but which the United States and others then turned into, basically, a regime change campaign, with NATO aircraft flying missions where they’re out to kill Qaddhafi.  From a Russian perspective, from a Chinese perspective—I think from a decent international legal perspective—that is, to say the least, an extremely problematic scenario.  And Russia and China were not about to let this scenario repeat itself in Syria.”    

Turning to Syrian oppositionists, Flynt suggests that it is unlikely they represent even a narrow majority of Syrians:  

“What about the 40-50 percent of Syrian society that continues to support Assad?  I think Assad retains the support of about half of Syrian society.  What about them?”  He also challenges some of the dominant images of Syrian oppositionists in the West—and defines that real choice confronting American policymakers with regard to Syria:   
“When you look at the situation in Syria, it’s obvious that many innocent people have been killed, and that is a profound tragedy.  But I think that the narrative in the West—that this was basically a peaceful protest by Syrians that was responded to brutally, and these people took all of this violence until a year later, eighteen months later, they had to start responding violently—I don’t think that’s really the way things played out…[O]utside powers—the Saudis, others—were pouring money and weapons into Syria from a very early point.
The agenda was not to bring democracy to Syrians.  I don’t think the Saudis care about that; frankly, I don’t think the United States cares all that much about that.  The agenda was to topple Assad as a way of hurting Iran’s regional position.  70,000 dead Syrians later, this project has not worked…Now countries like the United States face a choice.  They can either accept that this project of toppling Assad to hurt Iran has failed, and they can get serious about a diplomatic process that might produce a political settlement and end violence.  Or if they keep doing this, if they keep supporting the opposition, we’re going to be looking at literally years of continued violence, and who knows how many more tens of thousands of dead Syrians.
That is the choice…[For] as long as opposition groups have outside supporters like the Saudis, like the United States, who are in a sense egging them on, they have absolutely no incentive to face political reality and enter some kind of negotiating process…They don’t have an interest in doing that because there are outsiders who will help them keep the violence rolling along indefinitely.” 

Finally, Flynt challenges the fundamental premises of those criticizing the United States for not having “done more” in Syria already: 

“As far as the United States doing what ‘was necessary’ early on, there is this small matter of sovereignty, there’s this small matter of international law that says you only get to use force when the Security Council authorizes it or under a fairly narrow interpretation of self-defense in the UN Charter.  The United States has no right—it may have a hegemonic prerogative (or think it does), but it has no right—to impose no-fly zones over sovereign states to get rid of a leader that it doesn’t like…
[F]ind one case in which the United States applied military force, ostensibly for the protection of civilian populations, in which part of its agenda was not also regime change in that country.  If you look at the Balkans, if you look at Iraq, if you look at what we did in Libya, if you look at what we say we want to do in Syria—in every one of those cases, the argument for humanitarian intervention is inextricably bound up with the argument for coercive regime change.  Frankly, I think Russia and China are eminently justified in saying that they’re not going to enable that.”